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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-2320 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
 
JERRY BLASSENGALE, JR., a/k/a BJ, 
    Appellant 
 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2-07-cr-00371-002) 
District Judge: Hon. Bruce W. Kauffman 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
Friday, January 28, 2011 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judge, 
and STEARNS,
*
 District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed: February 8, 2011) 
 
OPINION 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Jerry Blassengale appeals the district court‟s judgment of conviction.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
                                              
*
 Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Court Judge, United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
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I. 
We write primarily for the parties and therefore will only set forth those facts that 
are helpful to our brief discussion of the issues.  Blassengale‟s sole issue on appeal is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for assaulting a federal officer 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.  He argues that his account of the arrest should be 
credited and that Special Agent Pacchioli actually caused the collision.  
 The argument ignores the fact that we must review challenges to the sufficiency of 
evidence, “in the light most favorable to the government, and [that we] will sustain the 
verdict if „any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‟” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Under this 
deferential standard, we must “presume that the jury properly evaluated the credibility of 
witnesses, found the facts, and drew rational inferences.” United States v. Iafelice, 978 
F.2d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), it is a federal crime when a person “forcibly assaults, 
resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 
114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.”  
There is an enhanced penalty under § 111(b), when a deadly or dangerous weapon is 
used. 
 Blassengale contends that he was not aware that federal agents were pursuing him 
when he fled the gas station and drove down Interstate 95.  He testified that he was 
unaware that Special Agent Pacchioli was even present until the collision at the end of 
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the chase.  However, a reasonable jury could have rejected his account for several 
reasons.  First, there was testimony to suggest that Blassengale was aware that FBI agents 
were present at the gas station.  The agents who approached his vehicle were wearing FBI 
bulletproof vests, and one agent testified that he made eye contact with Blassengale in the 
driver‟s side mirror.  Second, Pacchioli had activated his patrol car lights and siren during 
the entire car chase on Interstate 95.  The jury cannot be faulted for concluding that this 
would suggest that law enforcement agents were in pursuit.  Finally, Detective 
DiFrancesco, who was in the passenger seat of the car with Pacchioli, testified that he 
motioned several times towards Blassengale to try to get him to stop.  This evidence 
would readily allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Blassengale was aware that he was 
being pursued by law enforcement officers, and Blassengale‟s argument to the contrary is 
frivolous.  Moreover, we reject any suggestion that the government was required to prove 
that he knew that the officers who were pursuing him were federal law enforcement 
officers. “All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an intent to assault a federal 
officer.” United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975).  As the Court explained in 
Feola, we can not construe the statute “as embodying an unexpressed requirement that an 
assailant be aware that his victim is a federal officer.” Id.  
 Blassengale further argues that he never actually collided with Special Agent 
Pacchioli.  He contends that he was already pulled over with the engine off when the 
accident occurred.  However, the jury obviously rejected Blassengale‟s efforts to suggest 
that Pacchioli intentionally crashed into him in front of police and civilians.  There is 
nothing other than Blassengale‟s uncorroborated testimony to suggest that is what 
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happened, and the jury clearly rejected his testimony. Pacchioli testified that Blassengale 
was driving very quickly when he swerved into the patrol car.   Thus, there was more 
than sufficient evidence to establish Blassengale‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court‟s judgment of 
conviction. 
